Garvagh Glebe, a 26MW wind farm in Leitrim, made a loss of € 3.5 million last year and has racked up combined losses of € 5.6 million after nine years. In 2017, it had a load factor of 23% after it's availability dropped to 59%. This means it was out of operation for 40% of the year and when it was operating only running on average at 23% of it's potential output.
The wind farm was completely dependent on funding from it's shareholder ESB to continue operating for another 12 months. This makes a complete mockery of the idea that renewables are competing against fossil fuels. ESB, which owns most of the fossil fuel power stations in the country, can only maintain investment in it's loss making wind farms with funding from it's more profitable fossil fuel power sector.
In 2008, during construction of the wind farm, 6,000 fish, mainly trout, were killed when tonnes of peat swept through the Owengar river which runs into Lough Allen. A similar incident occurred in Co.Galway during construction of another ESB owned Derrybrien wind farm where around 50,000 fish were killed.
Showing posts with label load factor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label load factor. Show all posts
Monday, 12 November 2018
Tuesday, 17 April 2018
ESB - A Financial Perspective
This post will be a longer examination into the financials of electricity generation plant around the country (mainly wind). It will get a bit technical in places but I will do my best to explain terms used.
ESB is the largest energy company in Ireland and is 95% owned by the Irish State. Last year, it recorded a loss of €31 million after writing down the value of their generating assets by € 276 million. The operating profit before the impairment was € 490m, the lowest profit in the past five years.
Moneypoint is a critical piece of infrastructure. Without it, the 400kv lines in the west of Ireland will have insufficient voltage to carry the power eastwards. The impairment now means that Moneypoint coal power station is practically worthless. However, it must be noted that Moneypoint has been around since the 1980s.
Two of their power stations are to close altogether - Marina and Aghada (steam unit)
The published accounts do not show a breakdown of operating profit into fossil fuel / renewables (which seems to be a trend among the large energy companies), which would have been very useful. But there are indications that the renewables part of their business is not performing as might have been as expected.
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
The Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is used as an indicator for the Return on an Investment i.e. how much one pound spent on assets generates in profits. I have calculated it by taking the Operating Profit (profit before interest and tax) and divided by total assets less current liabilities. The sweet spot seems to be in the 14-17% range and this crops up in successful companies from across different industries. Successful Irish companies like Ryanair, Kingspan, Glanbia and Kerry Gold have ROCEs in the region of 14 - 17%. In the UK, Marks and Spencer's recent report shows an ROCE of 14%.
The ROCE for ESB seems to be around 6% historically. The highest I can find was 10% in 2007 when the prices of fossil fuels peaked. It now stands at 4.6% for 2017, which is historically low. It has dropped every year for the past three years from 6.5% to 6.1% to 4.6%. Low wholesale prices are of course a contributing factor. However, the average wholesale price rose from €41.82 in 2016 to € 47.48 in 2017 so we should have in theory have seen an improved ROCE ratio.
Comparable companies like SSE and E.ON have recently reported ROCE ratios in the region of 10% so ESB's ratio is comparatively low.
Interest Cover
A company needs to have enough profit left over from paying normal business expenses to cover interest payments on their loans. From Investopedia:
ESB in 2016 had a healthy interest cover of 3.5. However, this has dropped below the safety threshold to 1.1 in 2017.
Financial Statements
I will only be taking a look at the Generation part of ESB's business. ESB also have a retail and grid development business. The financial statements for the gas power station and wind farms are published on the CRO website. Only financial reports for 2016 and 2015 are currently available. There was a deterioration in profits in 2016. Presumably, things got even worse for the company in 2017.
Gas power
A look at the most recent accounts (2016) of ESB's gas power station in Dublin shows that it was still making good profits despite the low gas prices. Dublin Bay (400MW) made net profits of €28m and €43m in 2016 / 2015. The drop in profits was presumably due to a drop in wholesale prices of 18%. It had very healthy ROCEs of 19% and 29%. With accumulated profits of €41m by the end of 2016, the power station was doing very well. In 2015, a dividend had been paid out of € 37 million. It proves that the business model for gas generation is still very strong. The power station was built in 2002 so a very strong performance after 13-14 years of operation.
Of course, it is based in a high demand centre and is generating power to the grid most of the time. I was unable to find financial statements for any other power stations. I presume most of the other ones wouldn't have been as profitable.
Wind power
I looked at the financial statements of nine of ESB's wind farms in the South of Ireland. A total of 175MW of wind generation. 2015 is a good year to begin with as most of the farms had high load factors, equal to or above the national average of 33% (except for one - Derrybrien). All wind farms made an operating profit, however two made net losses, most notably Garvagh Glebe, a 26MW wind farm in Leitrim which made a loss of € 480,000 despite having the highest load factor at 42%. This was because of very high interest payments - which were about 45% of turnover.
The average ROCE was 6%, in line with the overall average for ESB Group. Another Leitrim wind farm, Blackbanks, had the highest ROCE at 11%. Blackbanks has a smaller 10MW output and interestingly has smaller (0.85kw) turbines than nearby Garvagh which has 2MW turbines, yet the smaller wind farm had double the ROCE of the larger one (remember that ROCE is based on profit before interest). This seems to fly in the face of conventional wisdom that says the bigger the turbine, the bigger the return.
Combined operating profits in 2015 for the nine wind farms was € 9.2m and net profits was € 2.1m. Depending on how you measure it, this gives an operating profit of €52,000 per MW and net profit of €12,000 per MW for 2015. Compare this with the gas power station in Dublin which had an operating profit of € 127,000 per MW and a net profit of € 107,000 per MW in the same year. Gas power was 2.5 times more profitable in 2015 than wind before interest and and nine times more profitable after. Operating profit, however, is the best way to compare the two generation sources as the gas power station had paid off most it's loans by 2016 and so had very low interest payments. Therefore, gas, which has fuel input costs, is two and half times more profitable than wind, which has no fuel input costs (and wind gets priority on the grid). This fact deserves a separate article on it's own but presumably the much higher load factor for gas has a lot to do with it.
By the end of 2015, accumulated profits from all these wind farms was € 14 million. One dividend of € 1.5m was paid out by Mount Eagle wind farm in Kerry. Again, this wind farm has the smaller older style wind turbine.
In 2016, the average load factor was still decent at 31% but the ROCE had switched to negative. All wind farms made a net loss apart from two. Combined losses for the year were € 5m. Over the two years, combined losses were € 3m.
In 2016, interest cover went from positive to negative. Average interest cover over the two years was 1.09, which falls short of the recommended baseline of 1.5. The ROCE would need to rise to at least 10% to reach a safe interest cover and to 15-16% to reach an ideal one.
The worse performing wind farms were the larger ones built in 2010 and 2011. The larger 2MW turbines on average cost 4.5 times more than the smaller older models for 2.3 times the capacity. In fact, these newer wind farms had high accumulated losses by the end of 2016 of € 6m and some had notes in their accounts stating that they were dependent on financial support from ESB group, which indicates that the higher output from their bigger turbines was not enough to compensate for the additional associated costs.
Two dividends were paid out, € 1m from Mount Eagle and € 1.5m from Blackbanks, both older wind farms with smaller 0.850KW turbines. They were both in good financial health by the end of 2016.
In total, ESB group had loans outstanding of €170 million to all nine wind farms by the end of the year.
In 2017, total impairments for wind farms was € 13 million. In Northern Ireland, the value of a wind farm in Tyrone had been written down by nearly €5m :
ESB's traditional generation model in Ireland has changed from investment in reliable power generation to renewables. However, there are signs that things have not turned out quite as planned with wind energy, in particular the newer and more costly wind farms have built up considerable losses. In essence, the older profit making gas generation fleet is subsidizing the newer loss making renewable generation. The older and smaller wind farms may well be benefiting from better sites, but it could also be the case that the smaller 1MW technology is more efficient. These smaller wind farms have by and large turned out to be good investments. The same cannot be said for the more recent wind investments.
There are still gains to be made from conventional baseload generation. As the grid becomes increasingly unstable in the future, there will be gains to be made for ESB in building fast acting fossil fuel generators that can be switched on quickly. If Moneypoint is converted to gas, it will certainly be profitable like Dublin Bay, but will leave ESB (and Ireland) increasingly dependent on gas lines from the UK which may not be as dependable in the future.
Wholesale prices are recovering so we should be seeing better profits for ESB. Investing in large loss making wind farms may be negating some of the benefits from higher wholesale prices. Other benefits from investing in wind farms such as carbon credits are no longer financially lucrative as the carbon price has fallen too low. ESB's investment in wind energy should be reviewed.
ESB Financial Report for 2017 : https://esb.ie/docs/default-source/investor-relations-documents/annual-report-and-financial-statements-2017-single-pages.pdf?sfvrsn=dae93bf0_2
ESB is the largest energy company in Ireland and is 95% owned by the Irish State. Last year, it recorded a loss of €31 million after writing down the value of their generating assets by € 276 million. The operating profit before the impairment was € 490m, the lowest profit in the past five years.
Following impairment reviews of the generation assets ESB recognised an exceptional impairment charge of €276 million in relation to Moneypoint (€142 million), Aghada Unit 2 (€69 million), Synergen (€30 million), Poolbeg (€21 million), Marina (€1 million) power stations and €13 million across five wind farms
Moneypoint is a critical piece of infrastructure. Without it, the 400kv lines in the west of Ireland will have insufficient voltage to carry the power eastwards. The impairment now means that Moneypoint coal power station is practically worthless. However, it must be noted that Moneypoint has been around since the 1980s.
Capacity contracts were not accepted for ESB’s open-cycle gas unit at Marina and the conventional steam unit at Aghada and, after many years of excellent performance and service to electricity customers, once I-SEM starts in May, there will be no commercial basis for the continued operation of these units.The loss of the steam unit at Aghada will increase emissions from the site as this generator would be more efficient than the open gas cycle turbines built there around the same time in the 1980s (there still remains a separate and very efficient CCGT at Aghada built in 2010).
The published accounts do not show a breakdown of operating profit into fossil fuel / renewables (which seems to be a trend among the large energy companies), which would have been very useful. But there are indications that the renewables part of their business is not performing as might have been as expected.
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
The Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is used as an indicator for the Return on an Investment i.e. how much one pound spent on assets generates in profits. I have calculated it by taking the Operating Profit (profit before interest and tax) and divided by total assets less current liabilities. The sweet spot seems to be in the 14-17% range and this crops up in successful companies from across different industries. Successful Irish companies like Ryanair, Kingspan, Glanbia and Kerry Gold have ROCEs in the region of 14 - 17%. In the UK, Marks and Spencer's recent report shows an ROCE of 14%.
The ROCE for ESB seems to be around 6% historically. The highest I can find was 10% in 2007 when the prices of fossil fuels peaked. It now stands at 4.6% for 2017, which is historically low. It has dropped every year for the past three years from 6.5% to 6.1% to 4.6%. Low wholesale prices are of course a contributing factor. However, the average wholesale price rose from €41.82 in 2016 to € 47.48 in 2017 so we should have in theory have seen an improved ROCE ratio.
Comparable companies like SSE and E.ON have recently reported ROCE ratios in the region of 10% so ESB's ratio is comparatively low.
Interest Cover
A company needs to have enough profit left over from paying normal business expenses to cover interest payments on their loans. From Investopedia:
The interest coverage ratio is used to determine how easily a company can pay their interest expenses on outstanding debt. The ratio is calculated by dividing a company's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) by the company's interest expenses for the same period. The lower the ratio, the more the company is burdened by debt expense. When a company's interest coverage ratio is only 1.5 or lower, its ability to meet interest expenses may be questionable.
ESB in 2016 had a healthy interest cover of 3.5. However, this has dropped below the safety threshold to 1.1 in 2017.
Financial Statements
I will only be taking a look at the Generation part of ESB's business. ESB also have a retail and grid development business. The financial statements for the gas power station and wind farms are published on the CRO website. Only financial reports for 2016 and 2015 are currently available. There was a deterioration in profits in 2016. Presumably, things got even worse for the company in 2017.
Gas power
A look at the most recent accounts (2016) of ESB's gas power station in Dublin shows that it was still making good profits despite the low gas prices. Dublin Bay (400MW) made net profits of €28m and €43m in 2016 / 2015. The drop in profits was presumably due to a drop in wholesale prices of 18%. It had very healthy ROCEs of 19% and 29%. With accumulated profits of €41m by the end of 2016, the power station was doing very well. In 2015, a dividend had been paid out of € 37 million. It proves that the business model for gas generation is still very strong. The power station was built in 2002 so a very strong performance after 13-14 years of operation.
Of course, it is based in a high demand centre and is generating power to the grid most of the time. I was unable to find financial statements for any other power stations. I presume most of the other ones wouldn't have been as profitable.
Wind power
I looked at the financial statements of nine of ESB's wind farms in the South of Ireland. A total of 175MW of wind generation. 2015 is a good year to begin with as most of the farms had high load factors, equal to or above the national average of 33% (except for one - Derrybrien). All wind farms made an operating profit, however two made net losses, most notably Garvagh Glebe, a 26MW wind farm in Leitrim which made a loss of € 480,000 despite having the highest load factor at 42%. This was because of very high interest payments - which were about 45% of turnover.
The average ROCE was 6%, in line with the overall average for ESB Group. Another Leitrim wind farm, Blackbanks, had the highest ROCE at 11%. Blackbanks has a smaller 10MW output and interestingly has smaller (0.85kw) turbines than nearby Garvagh which has 2MW turbines, yet the smaller wind farm had double the ROCE of the larger one (remember that ROCE is based on profit before interest). This seems to fly in the face of conventional wisdom that says the bigger the turbine, the bigger the return.
Combined operating profits in 2015 for the nine wind farms was € 9.2m and net profits was € 2.1m. Depending on how you measure it, this gives an operating profit of €52,000 per MW and net profit of €12,000 per MW for 2015. Compare this with the gas power station in Dublin which had an operating profit of € 127,000 per MW and a net profit of € 107,000 per MW in the same year. Gas power was 2.5 times more profitable in 2015 than wind before interest and and nine times more profitable after. Operating profit, however, is the best way to compare the two generation sources as the gas power station had paid off most it's loans by 2016 and so had very low interest payments. Therefore, gas, which has fuel input costs, is two and half times more profitable than wind, which has no fuel input costs (and wind gets priority on the grid). This fact deserves a separate article on it's own but presumably the much higher load factor for gas has a lot to do with it.
By the end of 2015, accumulated profits from all these wind farms was € 14 million. One dividend of € 1.5m was paid out by Mount Eagle wind farm in Kerry. Again, this wind farm has the smaller older style wind turbine.
In 2016, the average load factor was still decent at 31% but the ROCE had switched to negative. All wind farms made a net loss apart from two. Combined losses for the year were € 5m. Over the two years, combined losses were € 3m.
In 2016, interest cover went from positive to negative. Average interest cover over the two years was 1.09, which falls short of the recommended baseline of 1.5. The ROCE would need to rise to at least 10% to reach a safe interest cover and to 15-16% to reach an ideal one.
The worse performing wind farms were the larger ones built in 2010 and 2011. The larger 2MW turbines on average cost 4.5 times more than the smaller older models for 2.3 times the capacity. In fact, these newer wind farms had high accumulated losses by the end of 2016 of € 6m and some had notes in their accounts stating that they were dependent on financial support from ESB group, which indicates that the higher output from their bigger turbines was not enough to compensate for the additional associated costs.
Two dividends were paid out, € 1m from Mount Eagle and € 1.5m from Blackbanks, both older wind farms with smaller 0.850KW turbines. They were both in good financial health by the end of 2016.
In total, ESB group had loans outstanding of €170 million to all nine wind farms by the end of the year.
In 2017, total impairments for wind farms was € 13 million. In Northern Ireland, the value of a wind farm in Tyrone had been written down by nearly €5m :
A review of the Hunters Hill 20 MW wind farm in Co. Tyrone, Northern Ireland was undertaken at year end. An impairment loss of €4.9 million has been recognised in the income statement in respect of this wind farm. This impairment has arisen as a result of a reduction in load factor.ESB Networks division were also investing heavily in the grid infrastructure required to support renewables :
The focus of the 2017 investment in the transmission network was on continuing the reinforcement of the system to facilitate the connection of new renewable electricity generation.
Capital investment in the networks businesses continued in 2017 with €644 million (74% of total capital investment) invested in the networks infrastructure in ROI and Northern Ireland (NI)Conclusion
ESB's traditional generation model in Ireland has changed from investment in reliable power generation to renewables. However, there are signs that things have not turned out quite as planned with wind energy, in particular the newer and more costly wind farms have built up considerable losses. In essence, the older profit making gas generation fleet is subsidizing the newer loss making renewable generation. The older and smaller wind farms may well be benefiting from better sites, but it could also be the case that the smaller 1MW technology is more efficient. These smaller wind farms have by and large turned out to be good investments. The same cannot be said for the more recent wind investments.
There are still gains to be made from conventional baseload generation. As the grid becomes increasingly unstable in the future, there will be gains to be made for ESB in building fast acting fossil fuel generators that can be switched on quickly. If Moneypoint is converted to gas, it will certainly be profitable like Dublin Bay, but will leave ESB (and Ireland) increasingly dependent on gas lines from the UK which may not be as dependable in the future.
Wholesale prices are recovering so we should be seeing better profits for ESB. Investing in large loss making wind farms may be negating some of the benefits from higher wholesale prices. Other benefits from investing in wind farms such as carbon credits are no longer financially lucrative as the carbon price has fallen too low. ESB's investment in wind energy should be reviewed.
ESB Financial Report for 2017 : https://esb.ie/docs/default-source/investor-relations-documents/annual-report-and-financial-statements-2017-single-pages.pdf?sfvrsn=dae93bf0_2
Friday, 9 February 2018
Wind Farm that caused huge landslide makes losses for ESB
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| Photo : Irish Examiner |
The Commission claims also that the construction of the wind farm required the destruction of large areas of coniferous forest amounting to 263 hectares.
The Commission adds that, after the landslide which occurred on 16 October 2003 and the consequent ecological disaster, when the mass of peat which was dislodged from an area under development for the wind farm polluted the Owendalulleegh river, causing the death of about 50 000 fish and lasting damage to the fish spawning beds, Ireland carried out no fresh environmental impact assessment of this construction before the resumption of work on the site by the developer in 2004 [European Court Ruling 2008].
The construction of Derrybrien wind farm in 2003 caused a huge landslide resulting in the ecological disaster described above by the European Courts of Justice. Ten years later, Ireland still has not complied with their ruling and the EU are now seeking to impose fines on Ireland of €2 million.
The wind farm was the largest in Europe at the time with 70 vestas turbines (of 0.85MW each) giving a total output of 59.5MW. It began operation in 2006. Ten years later in 2016, the accounts show that the wind farm was making a loss of €2.3 million. Turnover dropped by 25% to €5m and operating costs increased by 17% to €6.3m from 2015. The company is owned by ESB and €20m in loans are still outstanding to them. It cost €64m to build.
The above graph compares the load factor (actual output / maximum output) for Derrybrien and the national average as published by Eirgrid since 2010. The load factor has dropped significantly in the past two years to 23% in 2016, which was less than the national average of 28%. Not great for a wind farm located in the windy west of Ireland. It could be that these particular wind turbines lose capacity over time. The first indication of a loss in capacity occurred in 2015 after eight years of operation. The national average was high at 33% whilst Derrybrien had a load factor 20% less at 26%.
A loss of wind turbine capacity means higher maintenance costs and this is reflected in the accounts where operating costs have increased to €6.3m from €5.4m in 2016.
The obvious question that needs to be asked about all this is are the massive environmental impact of wind farms built in such delicate areas worth it ? Whilst ESB will probably absorb these losses who finally pays ? ESB is 95% owned by the Government.
National Load Factors - Page 24 here.
Load factors for Derrybrien wind farm for 2015 and 2016 as per published accounts, other years were estimated based on annual turnovers.
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